# QUANTUM COMPUTING 6.

Jozef Gruska

Faculty of Informatics Brno Czech Republik

## Chapter 6. QUANTUM FOURIER TRANSFORM and SHOR'S ALGORITHMS

Perhaps the most significant success of quantum computing so far has been Shor's polynomial time algorithm for factorization that will be presented in this section. This is a highly nontrivial algorithm that uses a new technique, that of Quantum Fourier Transform, that will also be illustrated in this chapter.

The fastest classical algorithm to factor m bit numbers requires time  $\mathcal{O}(e^{cm^{1/3}(\lg m)^{2/3}}).$ 

Shor's factorization algorithm requires  $O(m^2 \lg^2 m \lg \lg m)$  time on a quantum computer and polynomial time on a classical computer.

Of interest and importance is also another Shor's polynomial time algorithm, for discrete logarithm, to be also presented in this chapter. We present also another than Shor's approach to quantum factorization.

Correctness and efficiency of Shor's algorithm is based on several simple results from number theory to be presented first.

#### FIRST REDUCTION

**Lemma 0.1** If there is a polynomial time deterministic (randomized) [quantum] algorithm to find a nontrivial solution of the modular quadratic equations

 $a^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n},$ 

then there is a polynomial time deterministic (randomized) [quantum] algorithm to factorize integers.

**Proof.** Let 
$$a \neq \pm 1$$
 be such that  $a^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ . Since

$$a^2 - 1 = (a+1)(a-1),$$

if n is not prime, then a prime factor of n has to be a prime factor of either a + 1 or a - 1.

By using Euclid's algorithm to compute

$$gcd(a+1,n)$$
 and  $gcd(a-1,n)$ 

we can find, in  $\mathcal{O}(\lg n)$  steps, a prime factor of n.

# SECOND REDUCTION

The second key concept is that of period of the functions

$$f_{n,x}(k) = x^k \bmod n.$$

It is the smallest integer r such that

$$f_{n,x}(k+r) = f_{n,x}(k)$$

for any k, i.e. the smallest r such that

$$x^r \equiv 1 \pmod{n}.$$

AN ALGORITHM TO SOLVE EQUATION  $x^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ .

- 1. Choose randomly 1 < a < n.
- 2. Compute gcd(a, n). If  $gcd(a, n) \neq 1$  we have a factor.
- 3. Find period r of function  $a^k \mod n$ .
- 4. If r is odd or  $a^{r/2} \equiv \pm 1 \pmod{n}$ , then go to step 1; otherwise stop.

If this algorithm stops, then  $a^{r/2}$  is a non-trivial solution of the equation

 $x^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}.$ 

EXAMPLE

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Let n = 15. Select a < 15 such that gcd(a, 15) = 1.
{The set of such a is \{2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14\}}
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Choose a = 11. Values of  $11^x \mod 15$  are then

11, 1, 11, 1, 11, 1

what gives r = 2.

Hence  $a^{r/2} = 11 \pmod{15}$ . Therefore

 $gcd(15, 12) = 3, \qquad gcd(15, 10) = 5$ 

For a = 14 we get again r = 2, but in this case

 $14^{2/2} \equiv -1 \pmod{15}$ 

and the following algorithm fails.

- 1. Choose randomly 1 < a < n.
- 2. Compute gcd(a, n). If  $gcd(a, n) \neq 1$  we have a factor.
- 3. Find period r of function  $a^k \mod n$ .
- 4. If r is odd or  $a^{r/2} \equiv \pm 1 \pmod{n}$ , then go to step 1; otherwise stop.

#### **EFFICIENCY** of REDUCTION

**Lemma 0.2** If 1 < a < n satisfying gcd(n, a) = 1 is selected in the above algorithm randomly and n is not a power of prime, then

$$Pr\{r \text{ is even and } a^{r/2} \not\equiv \pm 1\} \ge \frac{9}{16}$$

- 1. Choose randomly 1 < a < n.
- 2. Compute gcd(a, n). If  $gcd(a, n) \neq 1$  we have a factor.
- 3. Find period r of function  $a^k \mod n$ .
- 4. If r is odd or  $a^{r/2} \equiv \pm 1 \pmod{n}$ , then go to step 1; otherwise stop.

**Corollary 0.3** If there is a polynomial time randomized [quantum] algorithm to compute the period of the function

$$f_{n,a}(k) = a^k \bmod n,$$

then there is a polynomial time randomized [quantum] algorithm to find non-trivial solution of the equation  $a^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$  (and therefore also to factorize integers).

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#### FROM SIMON PROBLEM TO FACTORIZATION

- One can see Simon's problem as the one to find the unknown period of a function on *n*-bit integers that is "periodic" under bit-wise modulo-2 addition.
- One can see factorization problem as the one to find period of integer functions  $f_b(x) = b^x \mod n$  under ordinary addition. That is to find such an r that  $f_b(x+r) = f_b(x)$  for all x that is the smallest integer r such that  $b^r \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ .
- Large difficulty of this task is connected with the fact that values of the function f between  $f_b(x)$  and  $f_b(x+r)$  are almost randomly distributed and therefore knowledge of some of them give almost no clue about others.

# A GENERAL SCHEME FOR SHOR'S ALGORITHM



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## SHOR's ALGORITHM

1. For given  $n, q = 2^d, a$  create states

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{q}}\sum_{x=0}^{q-1}|n,a,q,x,\mathbf{0}\rangle \text{ and } \frac{1}{\sqrt{q}}\sum_{x=0}^{q-1}|n,a,q,x,a^x \bmod n\rangle$$

2. By measuring the last register the state collapses into the state

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{A+1}}\sum_{j=0}^{A}|n,a,q,jr+l,y\rangle \text{ or, shortly } \frac{1}{\sqrt{A+1}}\sum_{j=0}^{A}|jr+l\rangle,$$

where A is the largest integer such that  $l + Ar \le q$ , r is the period of  $a^x \mod n$  and l is the offset. 3. In case  $A = \frac{q}{r} - 1$ , the resulting state has the form.

$$\sqrt{\frac{r}{q}}\sum_{j=0}^{\frac{q}{r}-1}|jr+l\rangle$$

4. By applying quantum Fourier transformation we get then the state

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{r}}\sum_{j=0}^{r-1}e^{2\pi i l j/r}|j\frac{q}{r}\rangle.$$

5. By measuring the resulting state we get  $c = \frac{jq}{r}$  and if gcd(j, r) = 1, what happens with sufficient large probability, then from c and q we can determine the period r.

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PERIOD COMPUTATION for  $f_{n,a}(x) = a^x \mod n, q = 2^d$ 

Hadamard transform applied to the first register of the state  $|0^{(d)}, 0^{(d)}\rangle$  yields

$$|\phi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^d}} \sum_{x=0}^{q-1} |x, 0^{(d)}\rangle$$

and an application to both registers of the unitary transformation

$$U_{f_{n,a}}: |x, 0^{(d)}\rangle \to |x, a^x \mod n\rangle$$

provides the state

$$|\phi_1\rangle = U_{f_{n,a}}|\phi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^d}} \sum_{x=0}^{q-1} |x, f_{n,a}(x)\rangle$$

Note 1: All possible values of the function  $f_{n,a}$  are encoded in the second register in the state  $|\phi_1\rangle$ .

Note 2: We are interested in the period of the function  $f_{n,a}$  and not in particular values of  $f_{n,a}$ . Could we get period by measuring, several times, at first the second register and then the first one?

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For n = 15, a = 7,  $f_{n,a}(x) = 7^x \mod 15$ , q = 16, the state

$$U_{f_{n,a}}|\phi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{q}}\sum_{x=0}^{q-1}|x, f_{n,a}(x)\rangle$$

has the form

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$$\frac{1}{4}(|0\rangle|1\rangle + |1\rangle|7\rangle + |2\rangle|4\rangle + |3\rangle|13\rangle + |4\rangle|1\rangle + |5\rangle|7\rangle + \ldots + |14\rangle|4\rangle + |15\rangle|13\rangle).$$

If we measure at this point the second register, then we get as the outcome one of the numbers 1, 4, 7 or 13, and the following table shows the corresponding post-measurement states in the second column.

result	post-measurement state	offset
1	$\frac{1}{2}( 0\rangle +  4\rangle +  8\rangle +  12\rangle) 1\rangle$	0
4	$\frac{1}{2}( 2\rangle +  6\rangle +  10\rangle +  14\rangle) 4\rangle$	2
7	$\frac{1}{2}( 1\rangle +  5\rangle +  9\rangle +  13\rangle) 7\rangle$	1
13	$\frac{1}{2}(3\rangle +  7\rangle +  11\rangle +  15\rangle) 13\rangle$	3

The corresponding sequences of values of the first register are periodic with period 4 but they have different offsets (pre-periods) listed in column 3 of the table.

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#### **GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION of STEPS**

FOR SHOR's ALGORITHM



Figure 1: Graphical representation of steps of Shor's algorithm

#### DISCRETE FOURIER TRANSFORM

Discrete Fourier Transform maps a vector  $\mathbf{a} = (a_0, a_1, \dots, a_{n-1})^T$  into the vector  $DFT(\mathbf{a}) = A_n \mathbf{a}$ , where  $A_n$  is an  $n \times n$  matrix such that  $A_n[i, j] = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \omega^{ij}$  for  $0 \le i, j < n$  and  $\omega = e^{2\pi i/n}$  is the *n*th root of unity. The matrix  $A_n$  has therefore the form

$$A_{n} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 \\ 1 & \omega & \omega^{2} & \dots & \omega^{(n-1)} \\ 1 & \omega^{2} & \omega^{4} & \dots & \omega^{2(n-1)} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 1 & \omega^{(n-1)} & \omega^{2(n-1)} & \dots & \omega^{(n-1)^{2}} \end{pmatrix}.$$

The Inverse Discrete Fourier Transform is the mapping

$$DFT^{-1}(\mathbf{a}) = A_n^{-1}\mathbf{a},$$

where

$$A_n^{-1}[i,j] = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\omega^{-ij}$$

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#### SOME INSIGHTS into DFT

There is a close relation between Discrete Fourier Transform and polynomial evaluation and interpolation. Let us consider a polynomial

$$p(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i x^i.$$

Such a polynomial can be uniquely represented in two ways: either by a list of its coefficients  $a_0, a_1, \ldots, a_{n-1}$ , or by a list of its values at any n distinct points  $x_0, x_1, \ldots, x_{n-1}$ .

The process of finding the coefficient representation of the polynomial given its values at points  $x_0, x_1, \ldots, x_{n-1}$  is called interpolation.

Computing the Discrete Fourier Transform of a vector  $(a_0, a_1, \ldots, a_{n-1})$  is equivalent to converting the coefficient representation of the polynomial  $\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i x^i$  to its value representation at the points  $\omega^0, \omega^1, \ldots, \omega^{n-1}$ .

Likewise, the Inverse Discrete Fourier Transform is equivalent to interpolating a polynomial given its values at the n-th roots of unity.

#### QUANTUM FOURIER TRANSFORM

The Quantum Fourier Transform is a quantum variant of the **Discrete Fourier Transform** (DFT). DFT maps a discrete function to another discrete one with equally distant points as its domain. For example it maps a q-dimensional complex vector

$$\{f(0), f(1), \dots, f(q-1)\}$$
 into  $\{\bar{f}(0), \bar{f}(1), \dots, \bar{f}(q-1)\}$ 

where for  $c \in \{0, ..., q - 1\}$ 

$$\bar{f}(c) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{q}} \sum_{a=0}^{q-1} e^{2\pi i a c/q} f(a), \tag{1}$$

,

for  $c \in \{0, \ldots, q-1\}$ .

The quantum version of DFT (QFT) is the unitary transformation

$$\mathbf{QFT}_q: |a\rangle \to \frac{1}{\sqrt{q}} \sum_{c=0}^{q-1} e^{2\pi i a c/q} |c\rangle \tag{2}$$

The quantum version of DFT (QFT) is the unitary transformation  $\mathbf{QFT}_q: |a\rangle \to \frac{1}{\sqrt{q}} \sum_{c=0}^{q-1} e^{2\pi i a c/q} |c\rangle$ (3)

for  $0 \le a < q$ , with the unitary matrix

$$F_{q} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{q}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 \\ 1 & \omega & \omega^{2} & \dots & \omega^{(q-1)} \\ 1 & \omega^{2} & \omega^{4} & \dots & \omega^{2(q-1)} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 1 & \omega^{(q-1)} & \omega^{2(q-1)} & \dots & \omega^{(q-1)^{2}} \end{pmatrix}$$

where  $\omega = e^{2\pi i/q}$  is the *q*th root of unity. If applied to a quantum superposition,  $QFT_q$  performs as follows;

$$\mathbf{QFT}_q: \sum_{a=0}^{q-1} f(a) |a\rangle \to \sum_{c=0}^{q-1} \bar{f}(c) |c\rangle,$$

where  $\overline{f}(c)$  is defined by (1). Observe that

$$QFT_q: |\mathbf{0}\rangle \to \frac{1}{\sqrt{q}} \sum_{i=0}^{q-1} |i\rangle,$$

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#### SHOR's ALGORITHM — PHASE 1

Design of states whose amplitudes have the same period as  $f_{n,a}$ 

Given an m bit integer n we choose a  $n^2 \leq q = 2^d \leq 2n^2$  and start with five registers in states  $|n, a, q, \mathbf{0}, \mathbf{0}\rangle$ , where the last two registers have  $m = \lceil \lg q \rceil = d$  qubits.

An application of the Hadamard transformation to the fourth register yields the state

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{q}}\sum_{x=0}^{q-1}|n,a,q,x,\mathbf{0}\rangle.$$

and using quantum parallelism we compute  $a^x \mod n$  for all x in one step, to get

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{q}}\sum_{x=0}^{q-1} |n, a, q, x, a^x \bmod n\rangle.$$

As the next step we perform a measurement on the last register. Let y be the value obtained, i.e.  $y = a^l \mod n$  for the smallest  $l_y$  with this property. If r is the period of  $f_{n,a}$ , then  $a^{l_y} \equiv a^{jr+l_y} \pmod{n}$  for all j. Therefore, the measurement actually selects the sequence of x's values (in the fourth register),  $l_y, l_y + r, l_y + 2r, \ldots, l_y + Ar$ , where A is the largest integer such that  $l_y + Ar \leq q - 1$ . Clearly,  $A \approx \frac{q}{r}$ . The post-measurement state is then

$$|\phi_l\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{A+1}} \sum_{j=0}^{A} |n, a, q, jr + l_y, y\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{A+1}} \sum_{j=0}^{A} |jr + l_y\rangle.$$
(4)

after omitting some registers being fixed from now on.

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#### SHOR's ALGORITHM — PHASE 2.

#### Amplitude amplification by QFT

From now on we consider in detail only a special case. Namely that r divides q. In such a case  $A = \frac{q}{r} - 1$ . In such a case the last state can be written in the form

$$\phi_l \rangle = \sqrt{\frac{r}{q}} \sum_{j=0}^{\frac{q}{r-1}} |jr + l_y \rangle$$

and after  $\mathsf{QFT}_q$  is applied on  $|\phi_l\rangle$  we get:

$$\mathsf{QFT}_{q}|\phi_{l}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{q}} \sum_{c=0}^{q-1} \sqrt{\frac{r}{q}} \sum_{j=0}^{q-1} e^{2\pi i c(jr+l_{y})/q} |c\rangle = \frac{\sqrt{r}}{q} \sum_{c=0}^{q-1} e^{2\pi i l_{y}c/q} \left(\sum_{j=0}^{q-1} e^{2\pi i j cr/q}\right) |c\rangle = \sum_{c=0}^{q-1} \alpha_{c} |c\rangle$$

If c is a multiple of  $\frac{q}{r}$ , then  $e^{2\pi i j cr/q} = 1$  and if c is not a multiple of  $\frac{q}{r}$ , then

$$\sum_{j=0}^{\frac{q}{r}-1} e^{2\pi i j c r/q} = 0,$$

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because the above sum is over a set of  $\frac{q}{r}$  roots of unity equally spaced around the unit circle. Thus

$$\alpha_c = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{\sqrt{r}} e^{2\pi i l_y c/q}, & \text{if } c \text{ is a multiple of } \frac{q}{r}; \\ 0, & \text{otherwise}; \end{cases}$$

and therefore

$$|\phi_{out}\rangle = \mathsf{QFT}_q |\phi_l\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{r}} \sum_{j=0}^{r-1} e^{2\pi i l_y j/r} |j\frac{q}{r}\rangle.$$

The key point is that the trouble-making offset  $l_y$  appears now in the phase factor  $e^{2\pi i l_y j/r}$  and has no influence either on the probabilities or on the values in the register.

# SHOR's ALGORITHM — PHASE 3

#### Period extraction

Each measurement of the state  $|\phi_{out}\rangle$  therefore yields one of the multiples  $c = \lambda_r^q$ ,  $\lambda \in \{0, 1, \dots, r-1\}$ , where each  $\lambda$  is chosen with the same probability  $\frac{1}{r}$ .

Observe also that in this case the QFT transforms a function with the period r (and an offset l) to a function with the period  $\frac{q}{r}$  and offset 0. After each measurement we therefore know c and q and

$$\frac{c}{q} = \frac{\lambda}{r},$$

where  $\lambda$  is randomly chosen.

If  $gcd(\lambda, r) = 1$ , then from q we can determine r by dividing q with gcd(c, q). Since  $\lambda$  is chosen randomly, the probability that  $gcd(\lambda, r) = 1$  is greater than  $\Omega(\frac{1}{\lg \lg r})$ . If the above computation is repeated  $\mathcal{O}(\lg \lg r)$  times, then the success probability can be as close to 1 as desired and therefore r can be determined efficiently.<sup>1</sup>

In the general case, i.e., if  $A \neq \frac{q}{r} - 1$ , there is only a more sophisticated computation of the resulting probabilities and a more sophisticated way to determine r (using a continuous fraction method to extract the period from its approximation).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>As observed by Shor (1994) and shown by Cleve et al. (1998), the expected number of trials can be put down to a constant.

## **GENERAL CASE**

Let us now sketch Shor's algorithm to compute the period of a function  $f(x) = a^x \mod n$  for the general case.

 $QFT_q$  is applied to the first register of the state  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{q}} \sum_{x=0}^{q-1} |x\rangle |f(x)\rangle$  and afterwords the measurement is performed on the first register to provide an  $y_0 \in [0, \ldots, q-1]$ .

To get the period r the following algorithm is realized where  $\xi = \frac{y_0}{q}$ ,  $a_0 = \lfloor \xi \rfloor$ ,  $\xi_0 = \xi - a_0$ ,  $p_0 = a_0, q_0 = 1$ ,  $p_1 = a_1a_0 + 1, q_1 = a_1$ 

for j = 1 until  $\xi_j = 0$  do

• compute  $p_j$  and  $q_j$  using the recursion (for the case  $\xi_j \neq 0$ );

$$a_{j} = \left\lfloor \frac{1}{\xi_{j-1}} \right\rfloor, \xi_{j} = \frac{1}{\xi_{j-1}} - a_{j},$$
$$p_{j} = a_{j}p_{j-1} + p_{j-2}, \qquad q_{j} = a_{j}q_{j-1} + q_{j-2}$$

• Test whether  $q_j = r$  by computing first  $m^{q_j} = \prod_i (m^{2^i})^{q_{j,i}} \mod n$ , where  $q_j = \sum_i q_{j,i} 2^i$  is the binary expansion of  $q_n$ .

If  $a^{q_j} = 1 \mod n$ , then exit with  $r = q_j$ ; if not continue the loop.

The non-easy task is to show, what has been done, that the above algorithm provides the period r with sufficient probability (>  $\frac{0.232}{\lg \lg n}(1-\frac{1}{n})^2$ ).

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#### FIRST COMMENTS on SHOR's FACTORIZATION ALGORITHM

- Efficient implementations of  $QFT_q$ , concerning the number of gates, are known for the the case  $q = 2^d$  or q is smooth (that is if factors of q are smaller than  $\mathcal{O}(\lg q)$ ).
- Efficient implementation of modular operations (including exponentiation) are known.
- First estimation said that  $300 \lg n$  gates are needed to factor n.
- An estimation said that to factor 130 digit integers would require two weeks on an ideal quantum computer with switching frequency 1 MHz. However to factor 260-digit number only 16 times larger time would be needed.
- It has been shown that there is polynomial time factorization even in the case only one pure qubit is available and the rest of quantumness available is in mixed states.

#### SHOR algorithm - from theory to practice

- Of real practical interest is only quantum factorization of such n = pq, where n is at least 500-digit number. In such a case if d is to be the smallest integer such that  $2^d > n$ , then d has to be around a 1700-bit number.
- Periods need to be determined precisely in spite of the fact that they could be numbers of several hundred bits long!! However in such cases Quantum Fourier Transform circuits should work with phase factors with numbers proportional to  $\frac{1}{2^{j}}$  for so enormously large j that such small phases are practically impossible to realise. It therefore seems that there is no way practically to determine period for such large n.
- It can be shown that this is not the case. The reason is that phases do not have impact on discrete outcomes of measurements, only on their probabilities.
- It has been shown that relatively small "cuts" of QFT circuits, for example to delete all conditional gates that deal with wires more than 22 wires apart, are sufficient to do necessary calculations precisely enough.

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- Of the key importance for the efficiency of Shor's factorization algorithm is also the fact that exponentiation in  $b^x$  can be done efficiently.
- If computation would be done on classical computers than each  $b^x$  could be done efficiently by computing first values  $b^{2^j}$  for all j. However, would there be a need to do that for so many x that would be enormously inefficient. However, once this is done on quantum computer using quantum parallelism this can be done "only once" and this is also behind the overall efficiency of Shor's quantum algorithm.

#### FROM PERIOD FINDING to RSA BREAKING

# We will show now how an efficient period finding algorithm can lead to RSA breaking without factoring.

# **ORDER** in **GROUPS**

- If a is an element of a finite group G, then its order is the smallest integers k such that  $a^k = 1$ .
- Order of each element of a group G is a divisor of the number of elements of G.
- $\bullet$  This implies that every element  $a \in {\bf Z}_p^*$ , where p is a prime, has order p-1 and it holds

$$a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$$

## BREAKING RSA using PERIOD FINDING ALGORITHMS

We show that if Eve has an efficient algorithm to determine the period of functions  $f(x) = b^x \mod n$ in the group  $\mathbf{Z}_n^*$ , where n = pq for primes p, q, that is an algorithm to find the order of elements in  $\mathbf{Z}_n^*$ , then she can break the RSA cryptosystem with modulus n.

Let us have an RSA cryptosystem with modulus n, a public encryption exponent e and a secret decryption exponent d.

If Eve gets the cryptotext  $c = w^e$  of an unknown plaintext w, she will use her order finding algorithm to determine the order r of c in  $\mathbf{Z}_n^*$ .

**Observation** The order r of c in  $\mathbf{Z}_n^*$  is the same as the order of w.

Indeed, the subgroup of  $\mathbf{Z}_n^*$  generated by w contains clearly c and therefore it contains subgroup generated by c. However, the subgroup generated by c contains  $c^d = w$  and therefore contains subgroup generated by w. Since each subgroup contains the other they have to be the same.

Therefore if Eve can find the order of the known cryptotext c she will have also the order of unknown plaintext w.

Since e was chosen to have no factor with  $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$  and since the order r has to divide the order  $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$  of  $\mathbf{Z}_n^*$ , the encoding exponent e can have no factor in common with r. This means that e is congruent modulo r to a member e' of  $\mathbf{Z}_r$ , which has an inverse d' in  $\mathbf{Z}_r$  and d' is

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also a modulo-r inverse of e, that is

 $ed' \equiv 1 \pmod{r}$ 

Therefore, given a cryptotext c and publicly known modulus n, Eve can calculate easily, using the extended Euclid algorithm, d' on a classical computer.

This implies, that for some integer m it holds

$$c^{d'} \equiv w^{ed'} \equiv w^{1+mr} \equiv w(w^r)^m \equiv w(\text{mod } n)$$

and therefore an efficient period finding algorithm allows Eve to find the plaintext w without factoring n.

#### SHOR's DISCRETE LOGARITHM ALGORITHM

Shor's quantum algorithm for discrete logarithm will be again presented only for a special case.

The task is to determine an r such that  $g^r \equiv x \pmod{p}$  given a prime p, a generator g of the group  $\mathbf{Z}_p^*$  and an 0 < x < p. The special case we consider is that p-1 is smooth.

Using  $QFT_{p-1}$  twice, on the third and fourth sub-register of the state  $|x, g, \mathbf{0}, \mathbf{0}, \mathbf{0}\rangle$ , we get

$$|\phi\rangle = \frac{1}{p-1} \sum_{a=0}^{p-2} \sum_{b=0}^{p-2} |x, g, a, b, \mathbf{0}\rangle,$$

a uniform distribution of all pairs (a, b),  $0 \le a, b \le p - 2$ . By applying to  $|\phi\rangle$  the unitary mapping

$$(x, g, a, b, \mathbf{0}) \to (x, g, a, b, g^a x^{-b} \mod p)$$

we get

$$|\phi'\rangle = \frac{1}{p-1} \sum_{a=0}^{p-2} \sum_{b=0}^{p-2} |x, g, a, b, g^a x^{-b} \mod p\rangle.$$

Since parameters x, g will not be changed in the following computations we will not write them explicitly in what follows.

As the next step we apply  $QFT_{p-1}$  on  $|\phi'\rangle$  twice, once to map each a to each c with the amplitude  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{p-1}}e^{2\pi i a c/(p-1)}$  and once to map each b to each d with amplitude  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{p-1}}e^{2\pi i b d/(p-1)}$ . The resulting state will be:

$$|\phi_1\rangle = \frac{1}{(p-1)^2} \sum_{a,b,c,d=0}^{p-2} e^{\frac{2\pi i}{p-1}(ac+bd)} |c,d,g^a x^{-b} \bmod p\rangle.$$

$$|\phi_1\rangle = \frac{1}{(p-1)^2} \sum_{a,b,c,d=0}^{p-2} e^{\frac{2\pi i}{p-1}(ac+bd)} |c,d,g^a x^{-b} \bmod p\rangle.$$

Let us now measure the last register and denote by y the value we get.

The state  $|\phi_1\rangle$  then collapses into the state (before the normalization)

$$|\phi_2\rangle = \sum_{c,d=0}^{p-2} \alpha_y(c,d) |c,d,y\rangle,$$

where

$$\alpha_y(c,d) = \frac{1}{(p-1)^2} \sum_{\{(a,b) \mid y = g^a x^{-b} \bmod p\}} e^{\frac{2\pi i}{p-1}(ac+bd)}.$$

We now claim that if  $y = g^a x^{-b} \mod p$ , then  $y = g^k$  for some k such that

$$a - rb \equiv k \pmod{p-1}.$$

Indeed,

$$y = g^{a}x^{-b} \equiv g^{a}(g^{r})^{-b} = g^{a-rb}.$$

and, therefore, if  $a-rb\equiv k \pmod{p-1}$  , then

$$g^{a-br} \equiv g^k \pmod{p}$$

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Therefore

$$\alpha(c,d) = \frac{1}{(p-1)^2} \sum_{\{(a,b) \mid a-rb \equiv k \pmod{p-1}\}} e^{\frac{2\pi i}{p-1}(ac+bd)}$$

For the probability Pr that, for fixed c and d, we get by measurement of  $|\phi_2\rangle$  a value y is therefore

$$\Pr = \left| \frac{1}{(p-1)^2} \sum_{a,b=0}^{p-2} \left\{ e^{\frac{2\pi i}{p-1}(ac+bd)} \left| a - rb \equiv k \pmod{p-1} \right\} \right|^2.$$

By substituting  $a = k + rb + j_b(p-1)$  we get the probability

$$\Pr = \left| \frac{1}{(p-1)^2} \sum_{b=0}^{p-2} e^{\frac{2\pi i}{p-1}(kc+cj_b(p-1)+b(d+rc))} \right|^2 = \left| \frac{1}{(p-1)^2} e^{\frac{2\pi ikc}{p-1}} \sum_{b=0}^{p-2} e^{\frac{2\pi i}{p-1}(b(d+rc))} \right|^2$$

what equals

$$\Pr = \left| \frac{1}{(p-1)^2} \sum_{b=0}^{p-2} e^{\frac{2\pi i}{p-1}(b(d+rc))} \right|^2 = \left| \frac{1}{(p-1)^2} \sum_{b=0}^{p-2} (e^{\frac{2\pi i}{p-1}(d+rc)})^b \right|^2$$

The above probability Pr is therefore 0 if

 $d + rc \not\equiv 0 \bmod (p-1)$ 

because, as in the previous algorithm, in such a case the sum in the above expression is over a set of (p-1)st roots of unity equally spaced around the unit circle.

On the other hand, if

 $d \equiv -rc \pmod{p-1},$ 

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then the above sum does not depend on b and it is equal to

$$(p-1)^{-1}e^{(2\pi i k c/(p-1))}.$$

The square of its absolute value, the probability, is therefore  $\frac{1}{(p-1)^2}$ .

Consequence: the measurements on the first and second register provide a (random) c and a <math>d such that

$$d \equiv -rc \pmod{p-1}.$$

If gcd(c, p-1) = 1, r can now be obtained as a unique solution of the above congruence equation.

The number of computations needed to be performed, in order to get the probability close to 1 for finding r, is polynomial in  $\lg \lg p$ .

#### ANOTHER COMMENTS on SHOR's ALGORITHMS

- To factor an integer *n* Shor's algorithm uses  $O(\lg^3 n)$  steps and success probability is guaranteed to be at least  $\Omega(\frac{1}{\lg \lg n})$ .
- An analysis of Shor's algorithm therefore shows that by running the algorithm  $\mathcal{O}(\lg \lg n)$  times, therefore in total in  $\mathcal{O}(\lg^3 n \lg \lg n)$  times we have very high success probability.
- Shor's algorithms make some of the important current cryptosystems, as RSA, ElGamal and so on vulnerable to attacks using quantum computers.
- Shor's result have been generalized to show that a large range of cryptosystems, including elliptic curve cryptosystems, would be vulnerable to attacks using quantum computers.



#### HIDDEN SUBGROUP PROBLEM

All quantum algorithms we have been dealing with are to solve special cases of the following Hidden Subgroup Problem

**Given:** An (efficiently computable) function  $f: G \to R$ , where G group and R a finite set. **Promise:** There exists a subgroup  $G_0 \leq G$  such that f is constant and distinct on the cossets of  $G_0$ . **Task:** Find a generating set for  $G_0$  (in polynomial time (in  $\lg |G|$ ) number of calls to the oracle for f and in the overall polynomial time).<sup>2</sup>

**Deutsch's problem,**  $G = \mathbb{Z}_2$ ,  $f : \{0, 1\} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ ,  $x - y \in G_0 \Leftrightarrow f(x) = f(y)$ . Decide whether  $G_0 = \{0\}$  (and f is balanced) or  $G_0 = \{0, 1\}$  (and f is constant).

Simon's problem,  $G = \mathbb{Z}_2^n$ ,  $f : G \to R$ .  $x - y \in G_0 \Leftrightarrow f(x) = f(y)$ ,  $G_0 = \{0^{(n)}, s\}$ ,  $s \in \mathbb{Z}_2^n$ . Decide whether  $G_0 = \{0^{(n)}\}$  or  $G_0 = \{0^{(n)}, s\}$ , with an  $s \neq 0^{(n)}$  (and in the second case find s).

**Order-finding problem,**  $G = \mathbb{Z}$ ,  $a \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $f(x) = a^x$ ,  $x - y \in G_0 \Leftrightarrow f(x) = f(y)$ ,  $G_0 = \{rk \mid k \in \mathbb{Z} \text{ for the smallest } r \text{ such that } a^r = 1.\}$  Find r.

**Discrete logarithm problem,**  $G = \mathbf{Z}_r \times \mathbf{Z}_r$ ,  $a^r = 1$ ,  $b = a^m$ ,  $a, b \in \mathbf{N}$ ,  $f(x, y) = a^x b^y$ ,  $f(x_1, y_1) = f(x_2, y_2) \Leftrightarrow (x_1, y_1) - (x_2, y_2) \in G_0$ .  $G_0 = \{(-km, m) \mid k \in \mathbf{Z}_r\}$ . Find  $G_0$  (or m).

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 $<sup>^{2}</sup>$ A way to solve the problem is to show that in polynomial number of oracle calls (or time) the states corresponding to different candidate subgroups have exponentially small inner product and are therefore distinguishable.

**Graph automorphism problem:** Consider  $G = S_n$ , the symmetric group of all permutations on  $\{1, 2, ..., n\}$ . Let **G** be a graph on *n* vertices labelled  $\{1, 2, ..., n\}$ . For any permutation  $\sigma \in S_n$ , let  $f_{\mathbf{G}}$  maps  $S_n$  to the set of *n*-vertex graphs by mapping  $f_{\mathbf{G}}(\sigma) = \sigma(\mathbf{G})$ , where  $\sigma(\mathbf{G})$  is the graph obtained by permuting the vertex labels of **G** according to  $\sigma$ . For the function  $f_{\mathbf{G}}$ , the hidden subgroup of **G** is the automorphism group of *G*.

Note that for the graph automorphism problem the group G is non-Abelian.

#### IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOURIER TRANSFORM in $\mathbf{Z}_{2^m}$

The clue to the design of a quantum circuit to implement the QFT

$$|x\rangle \rightarrow \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^m}} \sum_{y=0}^{2^m-1} e^{\frac{2\pi i x y}{2^m}} |y\rangle$$

for  $|x\rangle = |x_{m-1}\rangle |x_{m-2}\rangle \dots |x_0\rangle$ , wher  $x_i$ s are bits, is the decomposition

$$\sum_{y=0}^{2^{m}-1} e^{\frac{2\pi i x y}{2^{m}}} |y\rangle = (|0\rangle + e^{\frac{\pi i x}{2^{0}}} |1\rangle)(|0\rangle + e^{\frac{\pi i x}{2^{1}}} |1\rangle) \dots (|0\rangle + e^{\frac{\pi i x}{2^{m-1}}} |1\rangle)$$

as shown on the next slide. The exponent in th l-th factor of the above

decomposition can be written as follows

$$\exp\left(\frac{\pi i(2^{m-1}x_{m-1}+2^{m-2}x_{m-2}+\ldots+2x_1+x_0)}{2^{l-1}}\right)$$
$$=\exp\left(\frac{\pi i(2^{l-1}x_{l-1}+2^{l-2}x_{l-2}+\ldots+2x_1+x_0)}{2^{l-1}}\right)$$
$$=(-1)^{x_{l-1}}\exp\left(\frac{\pi i x_{l-2}}{2}\right)\ldots\exp\left(\frac{\pi i x_1}{2^{l-2}}\right)\exp\left(\frac{\pi i x_0}{2^{l-1}}\right)$$

#### LEMMA

Let  $x \in \{0, 1, ..., 2^n - 1\}$  and let its binary representation be  $x_1x_2...x_n$ . For quantum Fourier transform

$$F|x\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{k=0}^{2^n - 1} e^{2\pi i x k/2^n} |k\rangle$$

it holds Lemma:

$$F|x\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} [(|0\rangle + e^{2\pi i 0.x_n} |1\rangle)(|0\rangle + e^{2\pi i 0.x_{n-1}x_n} |1\rangle) \dots (|0\rangle + e^{2\pi i 0.x_1 \dots x_n} |1\rangle)].$$

 $\mathbf{Proof:}\ \mathsf{This}\ \mathsf{follows}\ \mathsf{form}\ \mathsf{calculations}$ 

$$F|x\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^{n}}} \sum_{k=0}^{2^{n}-1} e^{2\pi i x k/2^{n}} |k\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^{n}}} \sum_{k_{1}=0}^{1} \dots \sum_{k_{n}=0}^{1} \exp(2\pi i x \sum_{l=1}^{n} k_{l} 2^{-l}) |k_{1} \dots k_{n}\rangle$$
(5)  
$$= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^{n}}} \sum_{k_{1}=0}^{1} \dots \sum_{k_{n}=0}^{1} \bigotimes_{l=1}^{n} e^{2\pi i x k_{l}/2^{l}} |k_{l}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^{n}}} \bigotimes_{l=1}^{n} \sum_{k_{l}=0}^{1} e^{2\pi i x k_{l}/2^{l}} |k_{l}\rangle$$
(6)  
$$= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^{n}}} \bigotimes_{l=1}^{n} (|0\rangle + e^{2\pi i x/2^{l}} |1\rangle)$$
(7)

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#### **DESIGN of CIRCUIT**

Starting, for convenience, with the reverse representation of x as  $x_0x_1 \ldots x_{m-1}$  we show how to implement

$$(|0\rangle + e^{\frac{\pi i x}{2^0}}|1\rangle)(|0\rangle + e^{\frac{\pi i x}{2^1}}|1\rangle)\dots(|0\rangle + e^{\frac{\pi i x}{2^{m-1}}}|1\rangle)$$

for qubits m - 1, m - 2, ..., 0, step by step, starting with (m - 1)-th qubit.

Using Hadamard transform on the m-1-th qubit we get

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|x_0\rangle|x_1\rangle\dots|x_{m-2}\rangle(|0\rangle+(-1)^{x_{m-1}}|1\rangle)$$

and then we can complete the phase  $(-1)^{x_{m-1}}$  to

$$(-1)^{x_{m-1}}exp(\frac{\pi ix_{m-2}}{2^1})\dots exp(\frac{\pi ix_1}{2^{m-2}})exp(\frac{\pi ix_0}{2^{m-1}})$$

by using conditionally, with respect to  $x_{m-1}, x_{m-2}, \ldots, x_1$ , phase rotations

$$exp(\frac{\pi i}{2^1}), \dots, exp(\frac{\pi i}{2^{m-2}}), exp(\frac{\pi i}{2^{m-1}})$$

This means that for each  $l \in \{1, 2, ..., m-1\}$  a phase factor  $exp(\frac{\pi i}{2^{m-l}})$  is introduced to the *m*-th bit if and only if *m*th and *l*th qubits are both 1. This will provide the state

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|x_0\rangle|x_1\rangle\dots|x_{m-2}\rangle(|0\rangle+e^{\frac{2\pi ix}{2^{m-1}}}|1\rangle)$$

This process can be repeated with other qubits. Each time we use once the Hadamard transform and then the unitary

$$\phi_{kl} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & e^{\frac{\pi i}{2^{l-k}}} \end{pmatrix}$$

which acts on the lth and kth qubit. The resulting circuit has then the following form:



#### **COMPLEXITY of FOURIER TRANSFORM**

- The naive algorithm to compute all elements of classical Fourier transform, element by element using basic definition, requires  $O(2^{2m})$  steps.
- A special recursive method, called Fast Fourier Transform, that recursively reduces computation of DFT in  $\mathbb{Z}_{2^m}$  to computation of two DFT in  $\mathbb{Z}_{2^{m-1}}$ , requires  $\mathcal{O}(m2^m)$  steps - a significant improvement.
- Quantum Fourier Transform in  $\mathbb{Z}_{2^m}$  can be done in  $\mathcal{O}(m^2)$  quantum steps.

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Moreover, in the classical case, physical representation of  $(f(0), f(1), \dots, f(2^m-1))$ 

requires  $\Omega(2^m)$  bits,

but in the quantum case representation of

 $c_0|0\rangle + c_1|1\rangle + \ldots + c_{2m-1}|2^m - 1\rangle$ 

requires only m qubits.

#### FOURIER TRANSFORM on FINITE ABELIAN GROUPS

We show now basics how the concept of Fourier Transform is defined on any finite Abelian group.

#### CHARACTERS of ABELIAN GROUPS

Let G be an Abelian group written additively, and |G| = n. A character  $\chi$  of G is any morphism  $\chi: G \to \mathbb{C}/0$ . That is for any  $g_1, g_2 \in G$  it holds:

$$\chi(g_1 + g_2) = \chi(g_1)\chi(g_2)).$$

This implies that  $\chi(0) = 1$  and  $1 = \chi(ng) = \chi(g)^n$  for any  $g \in G$ . Therefore, all values of  $\chi$  are *n*th roots of unity.

If we define multiplication of characters  $\chi_1$  and  $\chi_2$  by  $\chi_1\chi_2(g) = \chi_1(g)\chi_2(g)$ , then characters form so-called dual group  $\hat{G}$ . Groups G and  $\hat{G}$  are isomorphic for all Abelian groups G.

Example 1 Any cyclic group of n elements is isomorphic to the group  $\mathbb{Z}_n$  and all its characters have the form, for some  $y \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ :

$$\chi_y(x) = e^{\frac{2\pi i x y}{n}}.$$

Example 2 In the additive group  $\mathbf{F_2}^m$ , of all binary strings of length m, all characters have the form, for some binary *m*-bit strings *x* and *y*:

$$\chi_y(x) = (-1)^{x \cdot y},$$

where  $x \cdot y = \sum_{i=1}^{m} x_i y_i \mod 2$ 

#### **ORTHOGONALITY** of CHARACTERS

Any function  $f: G \to \mathbb{C}$  on an Abelian group  $G = \{g_1, \ldots, g_n\}$  can be specified by the vector  $(f(g_1), \ldots, f(g_n))$ , and if the scalar product of two functions is defined in the standard way as

$$\langle f|g\rangle = \sum_{i=1}^{n} f^{*}(g_i)h(g_i),$$

then for any characters  $\chi_1$  and  $\chi_2$  on G it holds

$$\chi_i |\chi_j\rangle = \begin{cases} 0, \text{ if } i \neq j \\ n, \text{ if } i = j \end{cases}$$

Therefore, the functions  $\{B_i = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\chi_i\}$  form an orthonormal basis on the set of all functions  $f: G \to \mathbb{C}$ .

## FOURIER TRANSFORM

Since any  $f: G \to \mathbb{C}$  has a unique representation with respect to the basis  $\{B_i = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\chi_i\}_{i=1}^n$ ,

$$f = \mathbf{\hat{f}}_1 B_1 + \ldots + \mathbf{\hat{f}}_n B_n$$

the function  $\hat{f}: G \to \mathbf{C}$  defined by

$$\mathbf{\hat{f}}(g_i) = \mathbf{\hat{f}}_i$$

is called the Fourier transform of f. Since  $\hat{f}_i = \langle B_i | f \rangle$ , we get

$$\mathbf{\hat{f}}(g_i) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \sum_{k=1}^n \chi_i^*(g_k) f(g_k),$$

and therefore in  $\mathbf{Z}_n$  the Fourier transform has the form

$$\hat{\mathbf{f}}(x) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \sum_{y \in \mathbf{Z}_n} e^{-\frac{2\pi i x y}{n}} f(y)$$

and in  $\mathbf{F}_2^m$  the Fourier transform has the form

$$\mathbf{\hat{f}}(x) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^m}} \sum_{y \in \mathbf{F}_2^m} (-1)^{x \cdot y} f(y).$$